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ABSTRACT
Tax Policies, Vintage Capital, and Exit and Entry of Plants. (December 2005)
Shao-jung Chang, B.A., National Cheng Chi University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis W. Jansen
Following Chamley, Lucas, Laitner, and Aiyagari, this dissertation continues to
explore the answer for the question of zero capital taxation by discussing how taxes
on capital income, labor income, and property affect the economy in the context
of a vintage capital model where the embodied technology grows exogenously. The
government maximizes social welfare by finding the optimal combinations of the three
tax rates in the steady state and examines the welfare gain/loss over and after the
transitions caused by different types of shocks. The simulation method used here is
linear approximation.
My results show that in the steady-state economy, given a fixed level of gov-
ernment expenditure and a zero property tax rate, the capital-income tax rate that
maximizes steady-state utility may be negative, zero, or positive depending on the
level of government expenditure. I also find that, for many values of government
spending, the highest level of steady-state utility occurs with a subsidy to capital
income and a tax on labor income. Finally, I find that when taxes on capital income,
labor income, and property are available, capital-income taxes are generally the last
resort to finance government expenditures.
My results show that in the transitional economy, when tax rates are perma-
nently changed and the government expenditure is near zero, the loss of utility over
the transition from no taxes to capital subsidies is too large so the idea itself is not
utility-enhancing. Secondly, I find that when the government expenditure is low and
a positive technology shock occurs, social welfare in the economy without capital-
iv
income taxes may perform better in the early phase of the transition but worse in the
later phase of the transition than that in the economy without property taxes. How-
ever, the situation becomes the opposite as government expenditures increase. In
addition, when one tax is allowed to change, a changing labor-income tax may bring
more utility over the transition than the other two taxes. Finally, when the govern-
ment expenditure is unexpectedly reduced, I find that using property taxes rather
than capital-income taxes stimulates consumption and employment more given a
higher initial level of government expenditure.
vTo my parents
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is widely known that taxing capital income is taxing future consumption.
Faced with taxes on capital income, consumers will consume more and save less to
avoid being taxed on capital income in the future. But why is capital income still
taxed?
Chamley (1986) discusses the optimal long-run capital-income tax rate, and ar-
gues that in an infinitely-lived representative agent model, even though the current
(short-run) capital-income tax rate may be positive (because the current capital stock
is fixed), the optimal capital-income tax rate should be zero in the long run. Lu-
cas (1990) and Laitner (1995) advocate this view and show that if the U.S. economy
switches from the currently positive capital-income tax rate to a zero capital-income
tax rate, and credibly commits to this rate of zero, the U.S. economy will experience
a welfare gain. Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) show that Chamley’s result is well
established even when his model is further extended. However, as Aiyagari (1995)
points out, the currently positive capital-income tax rate may be optimal. By also
using an infinitely-lived representative agent model and adding idiosyncratic shocks
to individual income and an uninsured market structure into the model, Aiyagari
argues that, faced with a fluctuating income, consumers have the incentive to save
more out of precautionary motives and thus overly accumulate capital. When cap-
ital is over-accumulated, the return on capital is depressed and falls below the rate
of time preference. A positive capital-income tax rate can discourage consumers’
willingness to save and adjust capital income so that the return on capital is equal
This dissertation follows the style of American Economic Review.
2to the rate of time preference.
A. The Aim of This Dissertation
This dissertation attempts to find out how capital-income tax rates affect welfare
in the long run in a vintage capital model where embodied technology progresses
exogenously and plants are retired if their current value becomes lower than their
scrap value. To be more precise, we want to know if the optimal capital-income tax
rate is zero or positive in a vintage capital model with the exit and entry of plants.
There are two elements that make this paper different from Chamley (1986)
and Aiyagari (1995): Vintage capital and the exit and entry of plants. The concept
of vintage capital is that technology is embodied within capital (either equipment
or machine) when capital is created, and the productivity of that capital cannot be
changed after it is made. When the productivity of the capital becomes too low,
firms invest in new capital. In Greenwood, Hercowitz, Krusell (1997), the authors
discuss if the idea of vintage capital is practical. They show that prices of equipment
have been declining over the post-war years, and they conclude that the technology
of producing equipment is making equipment either more productive or cheaper over
time. They conclude that the idea of vintage capital is able to explain this phe-
nomenon. 1 Literature on vintage capital and investment behavior has been growing
since then. 2 For example, Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu (1997) endogenize
the rate of embodied technology growth by building a two-sector model with human
capital accumulation and discuss how tax policies affect the compositions of the ag-
1For earlier literature on equipment or capital price and economic growth, please
see DeLong and Summers (1991) and Jones (1994).
2Literature on examining the assumption of vintage capital by using empirical
data at the industry level has also been growing recently such as Cummins and
Violante (2002), and Sakellaris and Wilson (2004).
3gregate capital stock. Yorukoglu (1998) argues why investment is lumpy when firms
can choose to replace or upgrade the current capital stock. 3 On the other hand,
Hopenhayn (1992) extends a stochastic model for a competitive industry to account
for exit, entry, sizes, and growth of plants. Campbell (1998) sets up a model to
simulate the correlations among exit and entry rates of plants and output over the
business cycle when an exogenous technology shock hits an economy. Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) further discusses the relation between firm dynamics and financial
markets.
This paper is based on the model of Campbell (1998), who observes the corre-
lations among exit and entry rates of U.S. manufacturing plants and their output
growth rates over the business cycle. He notes that the entry rate covaries positively
with the contemporaneous output growth rate, and the exit rate leads both the entry
rate and the output growth rate. To explain this pattern, his model is based on the
phenomenon of exit and entry of plants and the premise of embodied technology
growth. Business cycles occur when the embodied technology grows more or less
than expected. While a positive shock to embodied technology growth speeds up the
exit of marginal plants, more new plants are created and are embodied with higher
technology. After some time, when these new plants enter the economy, output grows
faster than the trend rate.
This paper departs from Campbell (1998) to discuss how tax policies affect the
economy in a vintage capital model and with exit and entry of plants. We introduce
a government that engages in government expenditure and pays for this by taxing
capital income, labor income, and/or property. The design of the exit and entry of
3Lumpy investment has been further related to the real-business-cycle theory re-
cently. For this part of literature, please see Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999),
Gilchrist and Williams (2000), and Thomas (2002).
4plants makes it possible to discuss the effect of a property tax. In our model the
plant value can be taxed when ownership of the plant is traded between consumers
and firms. When plant value is taxed, it becomes lower and marginal plants whose
value is now lower than the scrap value exit the industry. Cooley, Greenwood, and
Yorukoglu (1997) also discuss tax policies, but their main focus is on the effects of a
capital-income tax and an investment credit on the compositions of the capital stock
and welfare in the economy. In our model, government expenditure is assumed to be
fixed in the steady state, and tax rates are chosen to satisfy the government budget
constraint. There is no debt issued. The government attempts to maximize social
welfare by finding optimal combinations of the three tax rates.
Our results show that in a stationary economy, given a fixed level of government
expenditure and a zero property tax rate, the optimal capital-income tax rate may
be negative, zero, or positive dependent on the level of government expenditure.
We find that for many values of government spending the highest level of steady-
state utility occurs with a subsidy to capital income and a tax on labor income.
Finally, we find that when taxes on capital income, labor income, and property
are available, a positive capital-income tax is generally the last resort to finance
government expenditures. As for the transitional economy, we find that although
subsidizing capital by taxing labor brings more utility in the steady state when
government expenditure is small, the idea of moving from the current tax rates to the
optimal tax rates is impractical. In addition, we find that when a technology shock
hits the economy, letting labor-income tax rate fluctuate may bring higher utility
over the transition. Finally, we find that when government expenditure is higher,
using property tax rate rather than capital-income tax rate stimulates consumption
and employment more when there is an unexpected reduction in the government
expenditure.
5One contribution of this dissertation is to further expand our knowledge about
the optimal capital-income tax. Chamley (1986) tells us that in the long run, the
capital income tax rate should be zero. From Aiyagari (1995), we know that with
idiosyncratic shocks to income and a market structure of incomplete insurance, the
capital-income tax rate may be positive because positive capital-income tax rates can
prevent consumers from overly accumulating capital for precautionary motives. We
use a vintage capital model of the exit and entry of plants to calculate the optimal
capital-income tax rate and find that this rate is not generally zero. In addition, this
paper also contributes to the knowledge of the optimal way to finance government
expenditures by using capital-income, labor-income, and property taxes.
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II describes the model econ-
omy; Chapter III discusses the optimal tax policies in the steady state by examining
our simulation results; Chapter IV focuses on the transitions caused by several types
of shocks with the presence of government expenditure and tax rates; Chapter V
concludes.
6CHAPTER II
THE MODEL ECONOMY
A. The Story
In Campbell’s (1997) model, the private sector consists of consumers, firms, and
plants. Consumers, whose size will later be normalized to one, are identical in ability
and preference and are each endowed with same amount of initial wealth and one unit
of time per period. In each period, consumers maximize utility by allocating their
time between work and leisure and their wealth plus income between consumption
and investment in the ownership of plants.
The ownership of plants are traded between consumers and firms. Ownership is
purchased by consumers from firms at the end of the period, and is sold back to firms
at the beginning of the next period. In other words, plants are held by consumers
between periods, and by firms over periods. Plants are either operating plants or
developing plants. Operating plants are capable of production, while developing
plants are in need of more development (i.e. investment spending) before starting
to produce. There are also two types of firms. At the beginning of the period,
production firms purchase operating plants and manage them to produce the final
good, while investment firms purchase developing plants and further develop them.
In addition, production firms scrap unproductive plants after the production period,
while investment firms create new plants. At the end of the period, all existing
plants are sold to consumers. The timing of these events within a period is shown in
Figure 1.
Operating plants differ in productivity. The initial productivity of an operating
plant is partly decided by new capital created when the plant is built and is partly
7plants.
Time line
Production firms
Labor sold to production firmsA representative consumer
Investing on two types of assets
Operating plants Developing plants
production firms
Sold to Sold to
Investment firms
In the end, production firms liquidate by 
by selling all plants back to the consumer.
selling existing operating plants back to
the consumer; investment firms liquidate
investment firms
To−do things:
1: Develop plants created in the last period;
2: Build new plants.
t+1t
Endowed with
one unit of time
To−do things:
1: Produce the
aggregate good;
2: Retire unproductive
Figure 1. The Events in a Period
decided by the degree of success in using the capital with labor to produce the
final good a few periods later when the development process is over.1 The final
good produced by an operating plant can then be used as consumption good or new
capital. The idea of vintage capital in this model allows for new capital created
in each period to be endowed with the most advanced technology available in that
period. This frontier technology is assumed to grow exogenously. Capital, once
equipped inside a plant, cannot be replaced or upgraded until the plant is scrapped,
1In this chapter, the length of this whole development process is assumed for
illustrative purpose to take two periods and to be fixed across all new plants and
over time. In our quantitative experiment in the following chapter, the development
process takes five periods to complete, where one period can be thought of as one
quarter.
8so only new plants are equipped with new capital which in turn is embodied with the
leading-edge technology. 2 The subsequent evolution of productivity at an operating
plant depends on the idiosyncratic productivity shock which hits the plant between
periods, when consumers own the plant. 3 This shock is specific to individual plants,
in contrast to the embodied technology shock, which is specific to the whole economy
and incorporated into all capital of a particular vintage. The average next-period
productivity of an operating plant is expected to be as good as its current-period
productivity, so the idiosyncratic productivity shock has mean zero.
In comparison with those in traditional models who earn capital income by
renting their own capital to firms, consumers in this model earn capital income by
selling their own operating plants to production firms. 4 What production firms earn
from an operating plant is capital income from current production after paying labor
and then the scrap value from plants to be retired and the resale value from the rest
of the plants. Scrap value is measured in units of the final good, and in this model
the units of final good per unit of capital in scrapped plants is assumed to be fixed.
Because we assume free entry of firms, production firms compete with each other to
the extent that each firm earns zero profit. This implies that the sum of all earnings
from an operating plant at the end of the period should equal the purchase cost of
the operating plant, the price that production firms pay to consumers for the right
to operate the operating plant at the beginning of the period. In Campbell (1998),
trade in the ownership of plants is the mechanism for explicitly estimating the exit
2Yorukoglu (1998) assumes that a plant can either replace the whole capital stock
or upgrade part of it. How this assumption has an impact on the investment behavior
of a plant over the plant’s fixed lifetime is the focus in his paper.
3These shocks can be thought of as partly due to a random idiosyncratic
depreciation.
4Consumers earn no capital income from a developing plant whose productivity
remains undetermined until the plant enters the industry.
9and entry of plants. This mechanism may look odd at first, but as a matter of fact,
consumers in this model, just like those in traditional models, earn capital income
in each period. Here that income is realized in the price paid and price received on
the trade in operating plants. Note that investment firms also earn zero profit from
developing plants, again because of free entry.
After adding the government sector to the original model, our focus is changed
to study the effect of fiscal policy within this vintage-capital model with exit and
entry of plants. 5 In this model the government is assumed to finance government
expenditure by taxing capital income, labor income, and property. The last tax is
collected through a tax on trading the ownership of operating plants. Since operating
plants are traded twice between consumers and firms per period, it is assumed that
the property tax is imposed on the production firms at the beginning of the period.
The interesting part of the property tax lies on its influence on plant value, which
was originally decided by the productivity of a plant, and on the exit threshold
of productivity, which determines whether a plant survives through next period.
Initially we conjecture that there might be a trade-off between the capital-income
tax and the property tax for two reasons. First, compared to the tax base for the
capital-income tax, the tax base for a property tax is large so that the property
tax rate can be set at a relatively low rate compared to the capital-income tax
rate. Second, a property tax may influence social welfare because it affects the
exit threshold of productivity while capital-income tax does not. We assume the
government budget constraint is balanced in each period, and there is no other
instrument to pay for government expenditures. Our objective is to explore how
5Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu (1997) discuss a vintage-capital model in
which capital has a fixed lifetime and firms decide the optimal time to retire a plant
before the capital equipped inside of it reaches its end of lifetime.
10
capital-income, labor-income, and property taxes interact to decide the economy’s
long-run equilibrium. In the long run, the capital-augmenting economy grows at
a fixed rate, and government expenditure is assumed to grow at the same rate as
output. Therefore, after a growing economy is transformed to a stationary economy,
government expenditure is again fixed at some level.
B. The Productivity of a Plant
This section explains the decision of the initial productivity of a plant and the
evolution of its subsequent productivity until the plant is scrapped. The production
of the final good needs capital and labor. An operating plant i faces a Cobb-Douglas
production function with elements of effective capital and labor. Effective capital is
the ”real” unit of capital after its embodied technology is taken into account. At
period t, the production function for the plant i is:
yi,t = (ki,t e
vi,t)1−α nαi,t (2.1)
The capital stock of the plant, ki,t, is fixed over the plant’s lifetime, and its
size is normalized to one because the plant’s size is irrelevant. There is no limit on
a plant’s lifetime as long as it survives. The productivity of the plant is given by
evi,t , where e is the exponential function and vi,t is a random variable indicating the
plant i’s productivity at period t. The labor employed by the plant is ni,t, and its
output is yi,t. The share of labor income is α and is the same across plants and over
time. Effective capital is calculated as the product of the plant’s capital, ki,t, and
the plant’s productivity, evi,t . Suppose that the productivity of the plant i at period
t is evi,t . Its productivity at period t+1 is described by Equation 2.2. Note that vi,t
follows a random walk process. The innovation, εi,t+1, is one of the two idiosyncratic
11
shocks in this model. It symbolizes the fluctuation of a plant’s productivity. This
shock is realized between periods, when consumers hold the ownership of plants.
vi,t+1 = vi,t + εi,t+1 (2.2)
where
εi,t+1 ∼ N(0, σ
2) (2.3)
To decide the initial productivity of a plant, we first denote the leading-edge
technology as z and assume that this technology accumulates according to the fol-
lowing equation:
zt = µ+ zt−1 + ε
z
t (2.4)
where
εzt ∼ N(0, σ
2
z) (2.5)
Intuitively, the drift, µ, should be positive. The shock to the leading-edge tech-
nology is εzt . There are two factors deciding the initial productivity of a plant. One
is the leading-edge technology, and the other one is the degree of success in operating
the leading-edge technology, which is the second type of idiosyncratic shocks. For a
plant being created at period t and entering the industry at period t + 2, its initial
productivity is a random draw from the following normal distribution with mean zt
(the leading-edge technology at t) and standard deviation σe.
vi,t+2 ∼ N(zt, σ
2
e) (2.6)
All types of shocks, including the aggregate embodied technology shock and
the two idiosyncratic shocks, are revealed between periods. Note that when the
12
ownership of plants is traded at the beginning of the period, their new productivity
is observable to both consumers and firms, while at the end of the period, it is not
observable so that the resale price of plants is based on the expectation of the plant’s
productivity in the next period. Figure 2 illustrates the creation of a new plant
before it enters the industry.
Time line
Status: New Status: Developing
Status: Developing Status: Operational
one period of time, the plant is waiting for its capital
holds it actually does nothing to it.
By assumption that reallocation of capital takes
in position this period and the investment firm who
and before he/she sells it to a production
productivity is decided.
After the consumer purchases it back
firm at period t + 2, its initial level of
t + 2
1 unit of capital good
A new plant needs
which equals 1 unit of the
t + 1t
aggregate good
as a developing plant
The new plant is built and is
sold to the consumer
Figure 2. The Creation of a New Plant
C. Decisions by Production Firms
Production firms have several decisions to make in each period. The first one
is to decide the number of operating plants of different levels of productivity to
purchase at the beginning of the period. Once this decision is made, these firms hire
and allocate labor at the purchased plants, and after the production, they decide if
any of the purchased plants should be retired and sell the rest back to consumers.
A production firm’s profit-maximizing objective function at period t is shown as
13
follows:
max
kt(vt),nt(vt),st(vt)
−(1 + τ pt )
∫
∞
−∞
q0t (vt) kt(vt) dvt
+(1− τ ct )
∫
∞
−∞
kt(vt) [ e
vt(1−α) nt(vt)
α − wt nt(vt) ] dvt
+
∫
∞
−∞
η st(vt) kt(vt) dvt
+
∫
∞
−∞
q1t (vt) [ 1− st(vt) ] kt(vt) dvt
(2.7)
The first term is the total cost of purchasing operating plants of different pro-
ductivity vt that is paid to consumers at the beginning of period t. The value of a
plant with a certain vt at the beginning of period t is q
0(vt), and kt(vt) is the number
of such plants owned by the firm. The property tax that the firm pays for a plant
is proportional to the plant’s value and is τ pt . The second term is the net capital
income that the firm earns after paying labor income, wtnt(vt). The real wage is wt,
and n(vt) is the labor allocated at the plant with vt. The output of the plant with
vt is e
vt(1−α)nt(vt)
α, where the plant’s capital stock is normalized to one. The tax
rate on capital income is τ ct . The third term is the scrap value earned from scrapped
plants. The scrap value is assumed to be η per unit of capital and to be less than
one. The proportion s(vt) means the percentage of plants with vt to be scrapped
after current production. The last term is the resale value earned from the existing
plants. The value of the plant with vt at the end of the period is q
1(vt). Note that
except the first term, the other terms are income earned after production.
A production firm solves its problem in two steps. First, taking the labor hired
by the firm, nt, as fixed, the firm decides how to allocate its labor into their purchased
plants of different productivity. The firm’s problem is as follows:
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max
nt(vt)
∫
∞
−∞
kt(vt) [ e
vt(1−α) nt(vt)
α ] dvt (2.8)
subject to
∫
∞
−∞
kt(vt) nt(vt) dvt ≤ nt (2.9)
As shown in Solow (1960), after the firm’s effective capital is defined as k¯t =∫
∞
−∞
kt(vt) e
vt dvt, a solution for nt(vt) can be easily achieved as follows:
nt(vt) =
nt e
vt
k¯t
(2.10)
The solution for nt(vt), which decides the amount of labor hired at a plant with
a certain vt, depends on two factors, the labor-effective capital ratio and the plant’s
productivity. Because production firms are identical, each firm’s labor-effective cap-
ital ratio is the same as that for the economy.
At the second step, after nt(vt) is replaced with Equation 2.10, the firm’s ag-
gregate output can be simplified as the Cobb-Douglas production function, and its
objective function becomes:
max
kt(vt),nt,st(vt)
−(1 + τ pt )
∫
∞
−∞
q0t (vt) kt(vt) dvt + (1− τ
c
t )[ k¯
1−α
t n
α
t − wt nt ]
+
∫
∞
−∞
η st(vt) kt(vt) dvt +
∫
∞
−∞
q1t (vt) [ 1− st(vt) ] kt(vt) dvt
(2.11)
Next, the firm derives its first-order conditions with respect to kt(vt), nt, and
the proportion of plants with productivity vt to be scrapped, st(vt).
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wt = α [
k¯t
nt
]1−α (2.12)
q1t (vt) = η (2.13)
(1 + τ pt ) q
0
t (vt) = (1− τ
c
t ) (1− α) e
vt (
k¯t
nt
)−α + 1 { vt < vt } η + 1 { vt ≥ vt } q
1
t (vt)
(2.14)
The first equation decides the labor hired by the firm. The second equation sets
the exit threshold of productivity, vt, such that plants of this specific productivity are
indifferent between operation and shutdown after the production. The plant value,
which equals the expected sum of a stream of revenue earned from output net of
wages paid to labor, rises with the plant’s productivity, so a plant with productivity
higher than vt survives through the next period and exits otherwise. The third
equation implies that the optimal purchase of a plant with productivity vt yields
zero profit. The term on the LHS is the purchase cost of the plant with vt, and the
three terms on the RHS are the after-tax capital income, the scrap value if the plant
is scrapped, and the resale value if the plant is sold back to consumers, respectively.
1 {·} is an indicator function, which takes the value of 1 when the plant with vt
survives and 0 otherwise.
D. Decisions by Investment Firms
Investment firms make two decisions each period. The first one is to decide the
number of developing plants to purchase at the beginning of the period. Investment
firms purchase developing plants and further develop them. Meanwhile, these firms
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build new plants. At the end of the period, investment firms sell their plants to
consumers. An investment firm’s objective function at period t is presented as (2.15):
max
xt(0),xt(1)
[ q1it (1)− q
0i
t (0) ] xt(0) + [ q
1i
t (2)− q
0i
t (1) ] xt(1) (2.15)
The number of plants, xt(0), is created at period t, and xt(1) is the number of
plants created at period t− 1. The first term is the profits earned from creating new
plants. The second term is the profits earned from further developing plants created
in the last period. The resale value of a plant developed for j periods is q1it (j). The
cost of creating a new plant is q0it (0), and equals one because the capital stock of a
plant is normalized to one and the transformation from consumption good to capital
is one-to-one. The purchase cost of a plant created in the last period is q0it (1). The
zero-profit condition implies the following conditions:
q1it (1) = q
0i
t (0) = 1 (2.16)
q1it (2) = q
0i
t (1) (2.17)
E. Decisions by Consumers
Consumers are identical in preference. They consume the final good and invest
in the portfolio consisting of the ownership of plants with different productivity.
They are each endowed with one unit of time to allocate between leisure and work.
Utility comes from consumption and leisure. The problem for a consumer j at period
s is shown as follows:
max
cjt ,n
j
t ,i
1j
t ,i
2j
t ,k
j
t (vt)
Es
(
∞∑
t=s
βt u(cjt , 1− n
j
t)
)
(2.18)
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where
u(cjt , 1− n
j
t) = ln c
j
t + κ (1− n
j
t) (2.19)
subject to
cjt + q
1i
t (1) i
1j
t + q
1i
t (2) i
2j
t +
∫
∞
−∞
q1t (vt) k
1j
t (vt) dvt =
(1− τwt ) wt n
j
t + q
0i
t (1) i
1j
t−1 +
∫
∞
−∞
q0t (vt) k
0j
t (vt) dvt
(2.20)
k0jt+1(vt+1) =
∫
∞
−∞
1
σ
φ(
vt+1 − vt
σ
) k1jt (vt) dvt +
1
σe
φ(
vt+1 − zt−1
σe
) i2jt (2.21)
β is the discount factor. There are two constraints. The first one is the budget
constraint. At the beginning of period t, the consumer sells his/her plants including
operating plants and developing plants created in the last period, i1jt−1, to firms.
The number of plants with a certain productivity vt owned by the consumer j is
denoted as k0j(vt). At the end of period t, the consumer earns labor income, wt n
j
t ,
and invests in new plants that are created in the current period, i1jt , the developing
plants that are created in the last period and are going to enter the market in the
next period, i2jt , and the surviving operating plants of different productivity, k
1j(vt).
The second constraint shows the evolution of the next-period productivity of the
plants invested by the consumer. The first term on the RHS is the expected number
of the purchased operating plants having a certain productivity in the next period,
where σ is the standard deviation of v and 1
σ
φ(·) is the normalized standard deviation
of v. The second term on the RHS is the number of plants that are ready to enter
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the market and will have the same productivity in the next period, where σe is the
standard deviation of z and 1
σe
φ(·) is the normalized standard deviation of z. The
first-order conditions for the consumer j are:
q1t (vt) = Et [ β
cjt
cjt+1
∫
∞
−∞
1
σ
φ(
vt+1 − vt
σ
) q0t+1(vt+1) dvt+1 ] (2.22)
q1it (2) = Et [ β
cjt
cjt+1
∫
∞
−∞
1
σe
φ(
vt+1 − zt−1
σe
) q0t+1(vt+1) dvt+1 ] (2.23)
q1it (1) = Et [ β
cjt
cjt+1
q0it+1(1) ] (2.24)
κ = (1− τwt )
wt
cjt
(2.25)
The first equation decides k1j(vt), the number of surviving operating plants with
productivity vt. The second equation decides i
2j
t , the number of plants created in the
last period and starting to produce in the next period. The third equation decides
i1jt , the number of plants created in the current period. The fourth equation decides
the labor supply. The labor-income tax rate is τwt .
F. Decisions by Government
The government taxes capital income, labor income, and property to finance
government expenditure. Government expenditure does not enter the utility func-
tion. 6 There is no borrowing or transfer payment from the government to consumers.
6Since our interest is in the preferred combination of taxes, and since we are going
to hold the level of government expenditures fixed in the transformed and stationary
economy, this assumption is not important to our results.
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In equilibrium, government expenditure grows as fast as output so that it remains a
constant proportion of economy-wide output. The government budget constraint is
shown in Equation 2.26.
Gt = τ
w
t wt Nt + τ
c
t ( K¯
1−α
t N
α
t − wt Nt ) + τ
p
t
∫
∞
−∞
q0t (vt) Kt(vt) dvt (2.26)
where
Yt = K¯
1−α
t N
α
t (2.27)
Denote government expenditure as G. The N , K¯, K(v), and Y are labor,
effective capital, number of plants with productivity v, and output at the aggregate
level, respectively. The government investigates the effect of various combinations
of taxes on capital income, labor income, and property on the economy’s long-run
equilibrium given a fixed path of government expenditure.
This economic system includes the first-order conditions of production firms
(Equations 2.12, 2.13, 2.14), investment firms (Equations 2.16, 2.17), and con-
sumers (Equations 2.22, 2.23, 2.24, 2.25). In addition, there are two constraints
of consumers (Equations 2.20, 2.21), one definition of the effective capital, one gov-
ernment budget constraint (Equation 2.26), and two aggregate resource constraints
(Equations 2.28, 2.29) as follows:
Ct + I
1
t +Gt = Yt + η
∫ vt
−∞
Kt(vt) dvt (2.28)
I2t+1 = I
1
t (2.29)
Aggregate consumption is C and aggregate investment in the creation of new
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plants is I1. The second term on the RHS of the first equation is the units of the final
good that is transformed from scrapped capital. Note that investment defined in the
traditional way is either Yt − Ct − Gt or, equivalently, I
1
t − η
∫ vt
−∞
Kt(vt) dvt. The
second constraint ensures that all new plants enter the industry after the development
process is completed. All markets are cleared. In the next chapter, we examine
our simulation results and discuss how tax policies affect the economy’s long-run
equilibrium.
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CHAPTER III
THE STEADY-STATE ECONOMY
A. Approximating Integrals
To compute the steady-state values, we need to approximate the integrals ap-
pearing in various equations. These integrals mainly come from the distribution of
the number of plants with different productivity and the corresponding distribution
of the plant value. The method we use is the Gaussian quadrature approximation,
which was also used in Campbell (1997). To illustrate the idea of Gaussian quadra-
ture approximation, suppose there is a function as follows:
g(y) = b(y) +
∫ b
a
A(y, x)g(x)dx (3.1)
As there is no analytic expression for the integral on the right side of the equa-
tion, this method approximates the integral with a weighted sum as follows:
g(y) ≈ b(y) +
N∑
i=1
ωi(a, b)A(y, xi)g(xi) (3.2)
The abscissas xi’s and weights ωi’s are decided by the Gauss-Legendre N-point
quadrature formula. Each abscissa, xi, is located between a and b and is assigned
its weight, ωi. There are N chosen abscissas, (x1, x2, . . . , xN) to replace y in the
equation. With a system of N equations consisting of g(x1), g(x2), . . . , g(xN), the
distribution of g(y) can be approximated through simple matrix operations.
B. Building and Solving a Stationary System
Because the embodied technology grows constantly over time, such a non-
stationary economy needs a transformation to stationarity before steady-state values
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can be derived. The original economy is transformed in two steps. The first step is
to transform the economy into a labor-augmenting economy by defining:
ut = vt − zt−1 (3.3)
ut = vt − zt−1 (3.4)
KTt (ut) = Kt(ut + zt−1) (3.5)
ut is defined as the difference between a plant’s productivity at period t and the
leading-edge technology at period t − 1, and ut is defined as the difference between
the exit threshold of productivity at period t and the leading-edge technology at
period t− 1. The second step is to transform the labor-augmenting economy into a
stationary economy by defining:
C∗t = (e
−
1−α
α
zt−1) Ct (3.6)
I∗jt = (e
−
1−α
α
zt−1) Ijt ∀ j = 1, 2 (3.7)
K∗t (ut) = (e
−
1−α
α
zt−1) KTt (ut) (3.8)
K¯∗t =
∫
∞
−∞
eutK∗t (ut)dut (3.9)
G∗t = (e
−
1−α
α
zt−1) Gt (3.10)
After the second transformation, the new variables are consumption, C∗t , invest-
ment on plants undergoing different periods of development process, I∗jt , distribution
of number of plants with different productivity, K∗t (ut), effective capital, K¯
∗
t , and
government expenditure, G∗t . All are stable in the steady state. The transformed
equations are listed below, followed by the explanation of the solution method for
deriving steady-state values.
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Equations are divided into two groups in order to solve the system. The first
group includes the following equations:
If ut ≤ ut, then
(1 + τ pt ) Qt(ut) = (1− τ
c
t ) Dt e
ut + η (3.11)
If ut > ut, then
(1 + τ pt ) Qt(ut)
= (1− τ ct ) Dt e
ut
+Et {β
Mt+1
Mt
e−
1−α
α
(µz+εzt )
∫
∞
−∞
1
σ
φ(
ut+1 − ut + µz + ε
z
t
σ
) Qt+1(ut+1)dut+1}
(3.12)
Mt = Et { β Mt+1 Q
0i
t+1(1) e
−
1−α
α
(µz+εzt )} (3.13)
where
Q0it (1) = Q
1i
t (2) (3.14)
Mt Q
1i
t (2) = Et { β Mt+1 e
−
1−α
α
(µz+εzt )
∫
∞
−∞
1
σe
φ(
ut+1 + zt − zt−1
σe
) Qt+1(ut+1)dut+1}
(3.15)
η = Et {β
Mt+1
Mt
e−
1−α
α
(µz+εzt )
∫
∞
−∞
1
σ
φ(
ut+1 − ut + µz + ε
z
t
σ
) Qt+1(ut+1)dut+1} (3.16)
Before computation starts, the technology shock, εzt , and the inverse of con-
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sumption, Mt, can be omitted from these equations because there is no technology
shock in the steady state, and the steady-state consumption is constant. Given tax
rates on capital income and property, there are two unknown variables, Dt and ut,
and one unknown distribution of plant value, Qt(ut), in this group. To determine ut,
a number is chosen for Dt to derive the corresponding distribution of Qt(ut), and the
chosen Dt is the correct number if it satisfies the Equation 3.16. The second group
includes the rest of the equations:
Dt = (1− α) (
K¯∗t
Nt
)−α (3.17)
Mt (1− τ
w) α (
K¯∗t
Nt
)1−α = κ (3.18)
K¯∗t
Nt
=
∫
∞
−∞
K∗t (ut)
Nt
eutdut (3.19)
K∗t+1(ut+1)
Nt
= e−
1−α
α
(µz+εzt )
{
∫
∞
ut
1
σ
φ(
ut+1 − ut + µz + ε
z
t
σ
)
K∗t (ut)
Nt
dut +
1
σe
φ(
ut+1 + µz + ε
z
t
σe
)
I∗2t
Nt
}
(3.20)
e−
1−α
α
(µz+εzt )
I∗2t+1
Nt
=
I∗1t
Nt
(3.21)
G∗t
Nt
= (τwt α+ τ
c
t (1− α))(
K¯∗t
Nt
)1−α + τ p
∫
∞
−∞
Qt(ut)
K∗t (ut)
Nt
dut (3.22)
C∗t + I
∗1
t +G
∗
t
Nt
= (
K¯∗
Nt
)1−α + η
∫ ut
−∞
K∗t (ut)
Nt
dut (3.23)
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Since Dt is known now,
K¯∗t (ut)
Nt
,
K∗t (ut)
Nt
,
I∗2t
Nt
, and
I∗1t
Nt
can be derived. There are
three unknown variables left, and they are τwt , Mt, and
G∗t
Nt
. Given government
expenditure, the correct τwt is the value that satisfies Equations 3.22 and 3.23.
C. Parameters
Given government expenditure and tax rates on capital income, labor income,
and property, there are some parameters left to be defined. These parameters include
the labor-income share, α, the subjective discount factor, β, the scrap value, η, the
average growth rate of embodied technology, µ, the standard deviation of the shock
to the productivity of an incumbent plant, σ, the standard deviation of the shock
to the initial productivity of a new plant, σe, the standard deviation of the shock to
embodied technology growth rate, σz, and the marginal utility of leisure, κ.
Table 1 lists the values for these parameters as used in Campbell (1998). Labor-
income share is 0.66, which equals the labor’s average share in the U.S. economy.
Given the value of α, µz is chosen to match the model’s steady-state growth rate of
output, (1 − α)µ/α, which is 0.34% per quarter estimated between 1972 and 1988.
The annual risk-free interest rate equals the steady state growth path, β−1e(1−α)µ/α,
and is estimated as 4.4% so β equals 0.9926. σ are chosen as 0.03 out of a range of
values from 0 to 0.06. σe is chosen to be larger than σ so that young plants faces
more productivity uncertainty than old plants. Along with the scrap value η, σe
is set to match exit rates from the U.S. economies. Finally, σz is set so that the
standard deviation of the exit rate in the model equals 0.0026, which is derived from
the data. Note that because the labor, N , is estimated as 0.26 from the real data,
the marginal utility of leisure, κ, can be derived with other steady-state values under
no-government scheme. Following that, we perform our experiment on the effects
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of various combinations of tax rates on the economy by fixing this derived κ and
treating N as a variable.
Table 1— Parameter Values
α β η µ σ σe σz
0.66 0.9926 0.835 0.0066 0.03 0.36 0.0059
D. Optimal Tax Policies in the Transformed Model Economy
The goal of this section is to derive some interesting observations on social
welfare in the steady state from the simulation results of the quantitative experi-
ment. This experiment will proceed in three steps, involving various combinations
of capital-income, labor-income, and property tax rates. The first step, by assum-
ing zero property tax rate, the government looks for the optimal combination of
capital-income and labor-income tax rates that maximizes consumers’ utility, taking
government expenditure as fixed. This part of the experiment will provide informa-
tion on the optimal tax rate on capital for this model. Next, we are curious to know
if using a property tax instead of a capital-income tax is preferable for the economy.
Following that, we allow all three types of tax rates to change in order to examine
the combination that yields maximum utility for consumers.
As a basis for comparison, we derive the steady-state values for our economy
without government. This provides a baseline economy in which the resource allo-
cation is not distorted by any policy instrument. Provided the above parameters,
the distribution of plant productivity in the steady state is illustrated in Figure 3,
where the x-axis is labeled as percentage difference between plant productivity and
productivity brought by the leading-edge technology and the y-axis is labeled as
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units of plants of different levels of productivity. 1 As seen in Figure 3, this distri-
bution of plant productivity is right-skewed, and the corresponding mode is around
negative 25-30 percent. The average plant productivity is 6.6 percent less than the
leading-edge level.
Figure 3. Distribution of Plant Productivity in the Steady State
The derived steady-state aggregate and other relevant values are listed in Ta-
ble 2. Given the labor income share weight of 2
3
, output is 1.2649, created by the
Cobb-Douglas production technology with inputs of effective capital, 29.9368, and
labor, 0.26. Investment in new plants, 0.5077, net of scrapped capital, is net invest-
ment, 0.1762, so that consumption is 1.0887. Utility, which comes from consumption
and leisure, is 2.2895. Without considering embodied technology, K∗ is aggregate
1This distribution is approximated by 71 abscissas, and the reason to choose this
particular number is that singularity occurs with numbers larger than 71 in the
process of deriving the structure form of this model.
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capital, the sum of all physical units of capital, and is 31.0523, which is larger than
effective capital. The exit threshold, denoted as u, provides a guide for plants with
lower productivity to exit the market and is -49.51 percent. From this we derive the
exit and entry rates. The exit rate is the ratio of scrapped capital over aggregate
capital, while the entry rate is the ratio of new capital entering into the market
over aggregate capital. These values are 1.07 percent and 1.61 percent, respectively.
Represented as κ, the marginal utility of leisure is treated as a parameter. Given the
parameters in Table 1 and N of 0.26, the parameter κ is equal to 2.9790.
Table 2— Values in the Steady State without Government
K¯∗ N Y ∗ I∗ C∗ U∗
29.9368 0.2600 1.2649 0.1762 1.0887 2.2895
K∗ I∗1 u Exit Rate Entry Rate κ
31.0523 0.5077 -49.51% 1.07% 1.61% 2.9790
The ranges for government expenditure and tax rates are to be decided before
this quantitative experiment begins. Because the government fixes its expenditure
before collecting tax revenue, we set government expenditure first. Since the steady-
state output in the case of no government is 1.2649, we chose the set of potential
government expenditure to be { 10−9, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 }. In the subsequent grid
search for the optimal combinations of capital-income, labor-income, and property
tax rates, subsidies on capital income and property are also considered, again subject
to the balanced budget constraint. It is of interest to see if there are benefits to any
of these subsidies in the long run. Tax rates on capital income, labor income, and
property arbitrarily range from [ -50%, 50% ], [ 0%, 68% ], and [ -1%, 1% ], respec-
tively. The reason of property tax rates being narrowed between positive/negative
1 percent is because of the relative large tax base on plant value compared to firms’
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capital income. The increment searched for all three taxes is 0.01 percent.
To be able to estimate excess burden later, a lump-sum tax is also considered,
and consumption and utility are derived accordingly. Since the lump-sum tax is a
non-distorting tax instrument that doesn’t distort the decisions of investment and
work hours, it is simply collected via consumption. Table 3 shows these values. Con-
sumption, 1.0887, is directly reduced for different levels of government expenditure.
Table 3— Consumption and Utility in the Steady State with Lump-sum Tax
G∗ 10−9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
C∗ 1.0887 0.9887 0.8887 0.7887 0.6887
U∗ 2.2895 2.1931 2.0865 1.9671 1.8315
Enter the first part of this experiment, where property tax rate is set to zero.
Results for five different levels of government expenditure are illustrated respectively
in the following five figures. Each figure contains eight small figures, where the x-
axis is capital-income tax rate shown in percentage term. In the left top figure is the
corresponding labor-income tax rate with which the capital-income tax rate is used
to derive steady-state values. Among others, except the left figure in the second row,
the y-axis represents the percentage difference of variables derived with distortionary
taxes from those derived with lump-sum tax. As for the figure left, because the ratio
of government expenditure to output is itself percentage, its y-axis is simply the
difference between the ratio derived with distortionary taxes and that derived with
lump-sum tax. Besides this, only consumption and utility are influenced by lump-
sum tax, therefore most comparisons at this stage are made between steady states
with distortionary taxes and without tax except the figures in the bottom row.
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Figure 4 shows the results derived under different combinations of capital-income
and labor-income tax rates given government expenditure at 10−9. In the top left
figure, when capital-income tax rate rises from -50 percent to a zero percent, labor-
income tax rate slides from 25 percent to a near-zero percent. The x-axis stops
at zero because we do not consider a subsidy on labor income. The relationship
between these two rates is almost linear, implying that they are nearly perfectly
substitutable when government expenditure is near zero. Next, output in the top
right figure shapes concavely with both its starting and ending points staying close
to zero (from below). The concavity comes from the opposite movement of effective
capital and labor. In this case, when capital-income tax rate is negative, output
(almost) always performs better than that derived without tax and reaches its peak
about 1.95 percent more as capital-income tax rate is about -25 percent.
Because government expenditure is fixed and output is concave in the capital-
income tax rate, the ratio of government expenditure to output in the left figure
in the second row is convex. It starts at a near-zero point, falls to −1.5 × 10−9
percent when capital-income tax rate hits -25 percent, and then rises back to a near-
zero percent. The curves of effective capital and (net) investment are identical, and
their relationship with capital-income tax is negative. As the capital-income tax rate
falls by one percent, effective capital and investment grow by the same magnitude.
Normalized labor in the left figure in the third row drops from a near-zero percent to
almost 19 percent as capital-income tax rate falls from a zero percent. This illustrates
that, if capital-income subsidy rate is up by 2 percent, the corresponding 1-percent
increase in the labor-income tax rate brings about a 0.75-percent reduction of labor
force. The bottom two figures show that, with a negative capital-income tax rate,
consumption is always worse compared to the situation when no government exists.
On the contrary, utility is always higher because the increase in leisure makes up for
31Figure 4. Capital-income Tax, Labor-income Tax, and Other Values Derived When G∗ = 10−9 and τ p = 0
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Figure 4. continued
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the loss in consumption. This result is of course dependent in part on the assumed
utility function.
Observation 1: When government expenditure is close to zero, a capital-income
subsidy brings higher steady-state utility to the economy.
Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 show that the higher the government expenditure, the
more convex the relationship between capital-income and labor-income taxes. This
convexity implies that, when G∗ is 0.2 or more, tax revenue lost by lowering the
capital-income tax rate 1 percent needs to be filled in by using a larger increase in
the labor-income tax rate than was necessary when the capital-income tax rate was
originally lower. The output effect is positive only when government expenditure is
infinitesimally small, and it turns out to be negative when government expenditure
grows high enough. This change is due to the downward shifts in both effective capital
and labor. Lowering the capital-income tax rate stimulates investment when G∗ is 0.3
or less. Utility shifts downward with higher government expenditure although leisure
does increase to offset part of the effect of reduced consumption. When G∗ is 0.3 or
more, a negative capital-income tax rate harms social welfare. Lastly, because output
decreases with higher government expenditure, the ratio of government expenditure
becomes positive.
34Figure 5. Capital-income Tax, Labor-income Tax, and Other Values Derived When G∗ = 0.1 and τ p = 0
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Figure 5. continued
36Figure 6. Capital-income Tax, Labor-income Tax, and Other Values Derived When G∗ = 0.2 and τ p = 0
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Figure 6. continued
38Figure 7. Capital-income Tax, Labor-income Tax, and Other Values Derived When G∗ = 0.3 and τ p = 0
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Figure 7. continued
40Figure 8. Capital-income Tax, Labor-income Tax, and Other Values Derived When G∗ = 0.4 and τ p = 0
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Figure 8. continued
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The following table lists the optimal values in the steady state derived with
different levels of government expenditure, zero property tax rate, and a specific
combination of capital-income and labor-income tax rates. Note that while the
above figures illustrate differences from baseline steady-state values, Table 4 presents
steady-state values for the economy and not differences from a baseline.
Table 4— Values in the Steady State with Distortionary Taxes (τp = 0)
G∗ τc(%) τw(%) Y
∗ G∗
Y ∗ (%) K¯
∗ N I∗ C∗ U∗
10−9 -45.78 22.89 1.2719 7.86E-08 43.8822 0.2165 0.2582 1.0136 2.3475
0.1 -31.23 27.88 1.2230 8.18 37.9853 0.2194 0.2235 0.8995 2.2193
0.2 -15.83 33.66 1.1653 17.16 31.9467 0.2226 0.1880 0.7773 2.0641
0.3 0.99 40.64 1.0938 27.43 25.6325 0.2260 0.1508 0.6430 1.8643
0.4 20.82 49.86 0.9955 40.18 18.6566 0.2300 0.1098 0.4858 1.5719
Table 4 reveals several things about maintaining optimality with higher gov-
ernment expenditure. First, when government expenditure, G∗, is low (0.2 or less
in our simulation), the optimal capital-income tax rate, τc, is negative. As G
∗ rises
(here 0.3 or more), τc is positive. Second, both τc and the optimal labor-income tax
rate, τw, increase with G
∗. Third, the increase in τw results in more labor as G
∗
rises. Note that as G∗ is fixed, rising labor-income tax rate still discourages labor.
Fourth, among other variables, compared with steady-state values derived without
government, effective capital, K¯∗, and investment, I∗, are higher when G∗ is 0.2 or
less due to capital subsidies, and labor, N , derived with any level of government
expenditure, is lower due to positive labor-income tax rate. Fifth, consumption in
this table is lower than that derived with lump-sum tax in Table 3. Lastly and the
most interestingly, utility derived when G∗ is 0.1 or less is greater than that when
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G∗ is financed via lump-sum tax.
What causes this effect in this model? This effect seems to be a manifestation of
intertemporal optimization resulting in a steady-state capital stock below the Golden
Rule. 2 A set of taxes and subsidies can generate higher steady-state capital-labor
ratios and greater steady-state utility, but it is not optimal for this to occur starting
from an initial steady state without taxes. Because of discounting, the initial decline
in consumption and utility necessary to support the increased investment required to
accumulate the increased capital stock is too costly relative to the gain in steady-state
utility.
Observation 2: Capital subsidies can improve steady-state social welfare when gov-
ernment expenditure is low enough.
The goal of this second part of the experiment is to provide a policy comparison
for the government who considers the possibility of choosing one of either a capital-
income tax or a property tax as the policy instrument in addition to a labor-income
tax. Like Table 4, Table 5 summarizes the property and labor-income tax rates that
maximize utility and the corresponding steady-state values derived with different
government expenditure.
Compare Table 5 with Table 4. As G∗ rises, τw rises as does property tax rate,
τp, which is much smaller than τc. In all cases, the optimal way for the government
to finance its expenditure is to subsidize capital income or property when G∗ is low
and raise taxes on labor income and on capital income or property as G∗ rises until
eventually the tax rate on capital income or property becomes positive. Behavior of
other variables are similar as G∗ rises. Utility is also higher when G∗ is 0.1 or less
than that derived with lump-sum tax. Subsidizing property lowers the purchase cost
2See Romer (2001) for the relation between steady state and golden rule.
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paid by production firms at the beginning of the period and therefore raises these
firms’ incentive to purchase more plants to produce. Lastly, it is not obvious that
choosing one of either a capital-income tax or a property tax creates more utility
than choosing the other.
Table 5— Values in the Steady State with Distortionary Taxes (τc = 0)
G∗ τp(%) τw(%) Y
∗ G∗
Y ∗ (%) K¯
∗ N I∗ C∗ U∗
10−9 -0.41 22.89 1.2557 7.96E-08 42.9436 0.2147 0.2466 1.0092 2.3485
0.1 -0.31 27.74 1.2132 8.24 37.3607 0.2186 0.2158 0.8974 2.2195
0.2 -0.18 33.66 1.1605 17.23 31.6973 0.2220 0.1846 0.7759 2.0638
0.3 0.02 40.38 1.0946 27.41 25.5321 0.2267 0.1502 0.6444 1.8644
0.4 0.36 49.50 1.0013 39.95 18.7749 0.2312 0.1120 0.4894 1.5755
The third part of this experiment relaxes the limits on capital-income and prop-
erty tax rates by allowing both of them to move simultaneously and expands the set
of capital-income tax rate to [ -100%, 100% ] to match that of the property tax rate
as much as possible. The relevant results are illustrated in Figures 9, 10, and 11.
In Figure 9, the top figure features the change in the exit threshold as the prop-
erty tax rate rises. As shown in Equation 2.14, capital-income tax affects consumers’
willingness to invest, but its change does not affect the exit threshold of productivity.
On the contrary, for a production firm, a higher property tax rate seemingly increases
the purchase cost of a marginal plant at the beginning of the period, (1 + τp)q
0
t (vt),
but it also reduces the plant’ value, q0t (vt), which in turn reduces the plant’s re-
sale value at the end of the period, q1t (vt). According to Equation 2.13, when this
marginal plant’s resale value is less than η, the exit threshold must rise to satisfy
Equation 2.14 again, which in turn raises exit and entry rates. In the top figure,
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when the property tax rate is negative, the increase in the exit threshold is steep,
but when the property tax is positive, the increase in the exit threshold is less steep.
The bottom figure shows the same trend. From a tax rate of -1 percent to 0 percent,
the exit rate rises by 0.54 percent and the entry rate rises by 0.65 percent. As the
tax rate varies from 0 percent to 1 percent, the exit and entry rates rise by 0.32
and 0.39 percent, respectively. Note that the steps in the bottom figure come from
the limited ability to use more abscissas caused by a singularity when the matrix
decomposition is performed. 3
3With more abscissas, spans, created by the Gauss-Legendre N-point quadrature
formula between negative/positive one to simulate the distribution of the percentage
difference in plant’s productivity and the leading-edge productivity, become nar-
rower. With narrower spans, the exit threshold crosses one span to another more
easily so that exit and entry rates rise more quickly until steps are finally replaced
by a curve. However, since the problem of singularity exists, simply connecting the
middle point of each step to make it a curve may reduce confusions.
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Figure 9. Exit Threshold, Exit Rate, and Entry Rate
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The negative relationship between property and capital-income taxes is shown in
Figure 10, where government expenditure is 10−9. The capital-income tax rate falls
from 72.67 percent to -100 percent when the property rate rises from -1 percent to 0.52
percent. Output, effective capital, labor, investment, and consumption illustrate the
trend inherited from the exit threshold. Unlike the above aggregate variables rising
over the entire set of property tax rate, utility mildly falls after property tax rate
hits -0.21 percent, compared to its previous rising. The corresponding capital-income
and labor-income tax rates that maximize utility are, respectively, -22.78 percent
and 23.02 percent. The figure of the ratio of government expenditure to output
looks empty because of the extremely low ratio. Another figure to compare with
Figure 10 is Figure 11, where government expenditure is 0.4. In Figure 11, the shape
of the ratio of government expenditure to output is symmetric to that of output.
Capital-income tax rate, ratio of government expenditure to output, and labor move
upwards, while others move downwards. The rising trend for utility extends until
property tax rate reaches 0.77 percent, where the corresponding capital-income and
labor-income tax rates are -24.38 percent and 49.74 percent, respectively.
Table 6 records the combinations of capital-income, labor-income, and property
tax rates that creates the highest utility given a certain level of government expen-
diture, and the corresponding steady-state values. As before, the labor-income tax
rate, τw, increases with government expenditure, G
∗. While the property tax rate, τp,
also shows the same pattern as that of τw, the capital-income tax rate, τc, decreases
from -22.78 percent to -28.33 percent and then bounces back to -24.38 percent when
G∗ is 0.4. This result tells several things. First, when the government can avail itself
of all three taxes, τc is negative over a reasonable range of G
∗. Second, although
τc falls as G
∗ rises and starts to rise after G∗ reaches some threshold, (somewhere
between 0.3 and 0.4 in this case), τc stays negative and overall is relatively stable,
48Figure 10. Values in the Steady State When G∗ = 10−9
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50Figure 11. Values in the Steady State When G∗ = 0.4
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compared with τp and τw. Third, the optimal way for the government to finance
higher G∗ is through τp and τw rather than τc unless G
∗ is too high. In other words,
when more marginal plants are forced to exit the market by higher property tax rate,
capital subsidy is used instead to encourage the incentive to invest. Fourth, as the
previous cases, utility is higher than that derived with lump-sum tax again when G∗
is 0.1 or less.
Table 6— Values in the Steady State with Distortionary Taxes
G∗ τp(%) τc(%) τw(%)
G∗
Y ∗
(%) K¯∗ N C∗ U∗
10−9 -0.21 -22.78 23.02 7.92E-08 43.4442 0.2151 1.0109 2.3492
0.10 -0.06 -25.33 27.93 8.20 37.8242 0.2188 0.8985 2.2203
0.20 0.14 -27.88 33.65 17.15 32.0056 0.2226 0.7778 2.0646
0.30 0.40 -28.33 40.59 27.30 25.8504 0.2266 0.6448 1.8652
0.40 0.77 -24.38 49.74 39.82 19.0033 0.2309 0.4892 1.5762
Observation 3: When capital-income, labor-income, and property taxes are avail-
able to the government, a positive capital-income tax rate might be the last
resort for use when government spending is high.
In Chapter IV, we build up a dynamic system and discusses how the economy
responses to two types of shocks over the transition from the old steady state to the
new steady state.
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CHAPTER IV
THE TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY
A. Building and Solving a Dynamic System
To build a dynamic system, the first step is to linearize equations with respect
to all the transformed variables around their steady-state values and make each new
variable in the dynamic system either as a percentage change between its period-t
value and its steady-state value or as a difference between its period-t value and
its steady-state value if the transformed variable is already a percentage. Next,
these new variables are separated into four vectors, each containing control, state,
co-state, or exogenous variables, respectively. Following procedures described in
Campbell (1997), the linearized equations are also divided into four groups, and
each group of equations is then merged into a large matrix equation. The vector
containing exogenous variables accommodates different shock terms such as shocks to
the leading-edge technology, tax rates, and the transformed government expenditure.
Lastly, we use the method originally introduced in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1987)
to solve the dynamic system, which can be generalized as follows: 1
aa ∗ Et(Wt+1) + bb ∗Wt + cc ∗ Et(Zt+1) + dd ∗ Zt = 0 (4.1)
where
Zt+1 = φ ∗ Zt + εt (4.2)
Wt include state variables and co-state variables at period t. Co-state variables
1For further programming problem, please refer to Marimon and Scott (1999).
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are decided by state and exogenous variables at the same period. In this model
economy, co-state variables consist of the percentage deviations of the plant value
of operating and developing plants and of the percentage deviation of the price of
a contingent claim on one unit of consumption good as well. The state variables
include the percentage deviations of the number of plants with different levels of
productivity and of the percentage deviations of the previous investment on plants
that haven’t entered the market yet. Zt includes various types of exogenous shocks.
Control variables basically consists of the deviations of consumption, investment on
newly-built plants, labor, effective capital, exit threshold, and the price for capital
service. After control variables are determined by the co-state and state variables,
the corresponding deviations of the original (before transformed into stationary)
variables can be derived.
B. Quantitative Experiments
In this section, we perform four quantitative experiments which simulate the
transitional paths of various variables caused by different types of shocks. The ini-
tial setting of the economy is presumably in its steady state before any shock hits the
economy. In the first experiment, we suppose that initially the economy has very low
government spending and the tax rates are almost zero. According to the previous
chapter, when G∗ is 10−9, the optimal capital-income and labor-income tax rates in
the steady state are -45.78 and 22.89 percent, given a zero property tax rate. There-
fore, we would like to know how the economy will transit if the government starts
subsidizing capital by taxing labor at the fore mentioned optimal rates without expec-
tation. In the second experiment, we suppose that the economy is set to the optimal
tax rates that maximize its social welfare before a positive shock to the leading-edge
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technology hits the economy. The government maintains the pre-existing tax rates
and letting government expenditure fluctuate with other variables after the shock.
In other words, government expenditure is seen as a control variable, given tax rates
as fixed. In order to differentiate the effects of capital-income and property taxes on
the economy, a comparison is made between the transitional paths derived with the
zero property tax rate and those derived with the zero capital-income tax rate.
The third experiment is different than the second experiment in one place. We
suppose that the government lets one of the three taxes on capital income, labor
income, or property fluctuate instead of the government expenditure. We would like
to know which tax brings more utility over the transition. In the fourth experiment,
we suppose that the government lowers its expenditure unexpectedly and attempts
to satisfy the new level of government expenditure in the following periods by letting
tax rates fluctuate subsequently. With fixed government expenditure and the zero
property or capital-income tax rate, the dynamic system needs one more equation
that describe the relation between the other two taxes. Suppose the government
intends to guide tax rates to move from the original optimal combination to the new
one that is optimal in the steady state with new level of government expenditure
by setting a linear relationship which connects these two combinations of tax rates.
This linear relationship will serve as the needed equation.
1. Impulse Response to a Permanent Change in Tax Rates
In Figure 12 are the impulse responses of various variables caused by a per-
manent change in capital-income and labor-income tax rates when the transformed
government expenditure, G∗, is 10−9 before any shock occurs. Capital-income and
labor-income tax rates are assumed to be near zero in the original steady state, so the
economy has the least distortion on resource allocation. According to the previous
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chapter, in the steady state with the government expenditure of 10−9, the optimal
combination of capital-income and labor-income tax rates is -45.78 and 22.89 per-
cent, respectively, and therefore our first experiment is to simulate the transition
after the government suddenly changes these two tax rates from near zero to the
optimal rates. 2
The transition in each small figure in Figure 12 is the deviation of the variable
X from its original steady-state value. Its deviation at quarter t, xt, is defined as
Xt−Xst
Xst
if X is not a ratio, or Xt − X
s
t otherwise. In this case, X
s
t is the original
steady-state value derived with the near-zero capital-income and labor-income tax
rates. When capital-income and labor-income tax rates are changed permanently at
quarter 0, the exit threshold jumps up by 3.8 percent. The initial increase in the
exit threshold is caused by the dramatic fall in the capital-income tax rate, which
stimulates investment in new plants by subsidizing capital income, and its increase in
turn causes the exit rate to rise by 1.2 percent in the following quarter and the entry
rate to rise by 6 percent at quarter 5. Although the exit threshold is 1.6 percent
higher than its original steady-state value at quarter 40, it will gradually fall back to
its original steady-state value as time unfolds. Effective capital falls below its original
steady-state value from quarters 1 to 4 because more marginal plants exit the market
and steadily rises above its original steady-state value after more new plants enter
the market at quarter 5. To accumulate more capital, employment first jumps up by
15 percent but falls afterwards, and consumption, in contrast to employment, drops
by -28 percent at quarter 0 and gradually climbs back to about -10 percent at quarter
2Because of the linearization approximation, the approximation error caused by
the change in capital-income and labor-income tax rates, (-0.4578, 0.2289), might be
large. This experiment simply provides an idea about why moving from near-zero
capital-income and labor-income tax rates to the optimal ones might not be a good
idea.
57Figure 12. Impulse Response When (τc, τw) Changes From (0, 0) to (-0.4578, 0.2289)
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40. In the long run, employment should be around -17 percent (= 0.2165−0.26
0.26
× 100)
and consumption should be around -7 percent (= 1.0136−1.0887
1.0887
× 100).
The transitional path of output is the weighted sum of the deviations of effective
capital and employment, assigned with 1 − α and α as their respective weights,
where α is 2
3
. Output initially moves up by 10 percent because of the increase in
employment. Although output reaches its trough at quarter 4, it is still above its
original steady-state value. The transitional path of investment is derived from the
following simplified formula:
yt Y
∗ − ct C
∗ − gt G
∗
Y ∗ − C∗ −G∗
(4.3)
Investment increases by a surprising 240 percent at quarter 0 and stays 120
percent higher than its original steady-state value at quarter 40. Investment will be
around 47 percent (= 0.2582−0.1762
0.1762
× 100) higher than its original steady-state value
in the long run. After the government changes capital-income and labor-income
tax rates, government expenditure stays below its original steady-state value until
quarter 21. At quarter 0, government expenditure drops by -14 percent because
of the capital-income subsidy, and it keeps dropping until quarter 4 because of the
decrease in output. Lastly, the deviation of utility is decided by:
ct − κ nt N
∗
lnC∗ + κ (1−N∗) + 1−α
α
(t− 1) µ
(4.4)
The level of the leading-edge technology one quarter before the shock occurs,
z−1, is supposed to appear in the denominator and is assumed to be zero here. Utility
stays well below its original steady-state value over at least 10 years, which provides
an explanation on why moving from the near-zero capital-income and labor-income
tax rates to the optimal ones is not an attractive appeal if the loss of utility caused
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by the purpose of capital accumulation over the transition is taken into account.
Observation 1: Although subsidizing capital by taxing labor brings higher utility
in the steady state when the government expenditure is near zero, the fact that
the loss of utility caused by the change in the capital-income and labor-income
tax rates over the transition is too large makes this idea impractical.
2. Impulse Response to a Positive Technology Shock with Fixed Tax Rates
Figures 13 and 14 display the impulse responses of various variables caused by
a technology shock that unexpectedly raises the level of the leading-edge technology
by 1 percent, given the zero property tax rate. Capital-income and labor-income tax
rates are set to be the rates that maximize the economy in the original steady state
and are assumed to be fixed after the technology shock occurs so that the government
expenditure fluctuate over the transition like the first experiment. There are four
curves for the variable in each small figure, and each curve represents the deviation of
the variable from the original steady-state value derived with different levels ofG∗ and
the corresponding optimal tax rates. As G∗ rises from 0.1 to 0.4, the corresponding
curve types are solid, dashed and dotted, dashed, and dotted, respectively. Note that
variables which have the same steady-state values no matter in the original or in the
transformed economy are exit threshold, exit rate, entry rate, and employment.
In Figure 13, the top two figures and the left figure in the second row illus-
trate the transitional paths of the exit threshold, exit rate, and entry rate. The
steady-state values of these three variables are unrelated with government expendi-
ture because of the zero property tax rate, and they are -49.51 percent, 1.07 percent,
and 1.61 percent, respectively. After the shock hits the economy at quarter 0, the
exit threshold moves up by 1.095 percent, so marginal plants with the productivity
61Figure 13. Impulse Response When εz = 0.01, τp = 0 (G
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Figure 13. continued
63
Figure 14. Rest of the Impulse Response When εz = 0.01, τp = 0 (G
∗ = 0.1–Solid,
0.2–Dashed & Dotted, 0.3–Dashed, 0.4–Dotted)
difference between -48.415 percent and -49.51 percent are forced to exit. Afterwards,
the deviation of the exit threshold smoothly falls and reaches 1.04 percent at quarter
40. In the long run, because the shock size is 1 percent, the exit threshold should be
around 1 percent higher than the original exit threshold. There are two spikes for
the existing plants exiting the market. The first one occurs at quarter 1, and the exit
rate moves up by 0.35 percent. The second one occurs at quarter 6 after new plants,
built at quarter 0 and embodied with higher-than-usual level of technology, enter at
quarter 5, and the exit rate moves up again by 0.10 percent. The amplitude of the
first rise is 32.71 (= 0.35/1.07) percent of the steady-state exit rate. The entry rate
jumps up by 0.413 percent at quarter 5 and then falls only to rise again at quarter
10.
The deviations of effective capital, consumption, and employment are in the
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second and third rows of Figure 13, and it seems that government expenditure has
rather negligible effect on the transitions of the first two variables. Effective cap-
ital is fixed at quarter 0 but continues to fall in the following 4 quarters because
more marginal plants exit the market than usual. After hitting its trough at -0.6
percent, effective capital starts to rise at quarter 5 and becomes positive at quarter
7. At quarter 40, effective capital is 0.95 percent higher than its original steady-
state value. Consumption and employment react in opposite direction right after the
shock happens. Consumption is smoothed by first dropping by -0.2 percent and then
steadily increasing 0.4 percent through quarter 40. Employment with higher gov-
ernment expenditure tends to respond a bit less to the shock than that with lower
government expenditure, but their transitional paths stay pretty close. Generally
speaking, employment jumps up by 0.6 percent at quarter 0 because of the fixed
capital and the incentive to invest more on new plants built at that same quarter,
and then after quarter 0, employment keeps falling until it rises again at quarter 5
and finally reaches 0.3 percent at quarter 40.
At quarter 0, output rises by 0.4 percent due to the sudden increase in employ-
ment, and then, just like effective capital and employment, it falls after quarter 0
but rises at quarter 5. Although employment starts to fall after quarter 16, output
keeps rising and stops at 0.5 percent higher than the original steady-state value at
quarter 40. Investment on building new plants rises by 2.7 percent at quarter 0
but turns negative after quarter 2. It bounces up after quarter 4 and stays 1.7 per-
cent higher than the original steady-state value at quarter 40. In Figure 14 are the
transitions of the government expenditure and utility. The transitional path of the
government expenditure is identical to output’s because of the zero property tax rate
and the fixity of the capital-income and labor-income tax rates over the transition.
The transition of utility with higher G∗ seems to be more volatile. The transitional
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paths of utility derived with the zero property tax rate and those derived with the
zero capital-income tax rate will be compared and discussed more in detail in the
later part.
Next, the result shown in Figures 15 and 16 is the impulse responses caused
by 1-percent technology shock, given a zero capital-income tax rate. How are these
transitional paths different from those in the previous case? In the top left part of
Figure 15 is the transitional path of the exit threshold. Economies with different lev-
els of G∗ in the original steady state obviously differ in responding to the technology
shock compared with those in the previous case of the zero property tax rate. As
the technology shock occurs, the exit threshold of the economy with G∗ being 0.1
moves up by 1.15 percent, and its following fall through quarter 40 is 0.08 percent
while the corresponding numbers for the economy with G∗ being 0.4 are 1.02 per-
cent and 0.015 percent, respectively. By comparing these numbers with the original
steady-state values of the optimal property tax rates and exit thresholds (listed in
the second row of Table 7), it indicates that economies with low G∗, low optimal
property tax rate, and thus low exit threshold, tends to respond more than those
with higher G∗ after the shock happens.
Table 7— Exit Threshold, Exit Rate, and Entry Rate
Original G∗ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
SS Exit Threshold (%) -57.51 -53.65 -49.17 -43.40
SS Exit Rate (%) 0.92 0.99 1.07 1.16
∆ExitRate1 (%) 0.27 0.30 0.39 0.61
Entry Rate (%) 1.43 1.52 1.61 1.72
∆EntryRate5(%) 0.31 0.35 0.47 0.76
However, relatively large initial rise in the exit threshold does not necessarily
66Figure 15. Impulse Response When εz = 0.01, τc = 0 (G
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Figure 16. Rest of the Impulse Response When εz = 0.01, τc = 0 (G
∗ = 0.1–Solid,
0.2–Dashed & Dotted, 0.3–Dashed, 0.4–Dotted)
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bring in a larger change in exit (or entry) rate here. As shown in Table 7, it is the
economy with G∗ being 0.4 that has the highest exit rate, 0.61 percent, at quarter
1, while that with G∗ being 0.1 has the lowest exit rate, 0.27 percent. The reason
for this is because when G∗ is high, the level of the initial capital stock is lower
and because the density of the steady-state distribution of productivity difference in
Figure 3 rises around these relevant exit thresholds.
Next, effective capital derived with higher G∗ drops more than that derived with
lower G∗ because economies with higher G∗ have higher exit rate at quarter 1. This
situation lasts until quarter 5 as new plants embodied with higher-than-usual tech-
nology finally enter the market. After quarter 5, it seems that economies with higher
G∗ gradually accumulate effective capital in a quicker pace than those with lower G∗.
In consumption, faced with more volatile transition of effective capital, economies
with higher G∗ adjust it by cutting more consumption initially and enjoying more
rapid consumption growth later. Employment in economies with higher G∗ initially
rises more but falls more afterwards because of the higher exit rate of plants and the
higher labor-income tax rate. As a whole, employment starts to rise after quarter 4,
and in the long run, the deviation of the employment in economies with higher G∗
is less than that in economies with lower G∗.
The deviation of output is determined by those of effective capital and em-
ployment. Economies with higher G∗ tend to have larger deviation in investment.
The transitional paths of government expenditure derived with different levels of
G∗ respond differently compared to those in the case of the zero property tax rate.
Because the property tax rate is not zero, which implies that the change in the exit
threshold or plant value affects the government expenditure, this transitional path is
not identical to output’s as in the case of the zero property tax rate. The deviation of
government expenditure derived with lower G∗ in the original steady state tends to
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be positive because when G∗ is lower in the original steady state, the optimal prop-
erty tax rate is negative. When the number of plants falls, the subsidy on property
is not as much as before, so without property tax rate changed, government expendi-
ture increases when other variables do not perform as well. Finally, the transition of
utility is more volatile when G∗ is higher, because its consumption and employment
usually respond more compared with those derived with lower G∗.
Observation 2: In contrast to the similarity among the transitional paths of a
variable derived with different G∗ in the case of the zero property tax rate,
the transition of a variable derived with a higher G∗ in the case of the zero
capital-income tax rate seems to respond more than that derived with a lower
G∗ when faced with a positive technology shock.
The deviations of utility derived from the zero property tax rate or zero capital-
income tax rate are compared in Figure 17. In each small figure, the solid curve is
derived when the property tax rate is zero, and the dashed one is derived when the
capital-income tax rate is zero. In the top left figure, when the original G∗ is 0.1, the
dashed curve is above the solid one before quarter 20 and is below afterwards. In the
bottom left figure, when G∗ is 0.3, the dashed curve matches the solid one. This is
because in the case of zero capital-income tax rate, the original optimal property tax
rate when G∗ is 0.3 is 0.02 percent, which is very close to 0 percent, and because of
this, the steady-state exit threshold is close, and the exit and entry rates are the same
as those when the government uses optimal capital-income tax rate. In the bottom
right figure, the dashed curve is not always above the solid one before quarter 15 but
becomes above to the other curve afterwards.
In the top two figures, with G∗ is smaller than 0.3, the steady-state exit thresh-
old, exit rate, and entry rate are smaller than those when G∗ is 0.3. And in the
70Figure 17. Impulse Response: τp = 0 (Solid) vs. τc = 0 (Dashed)
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bottom right figure, these three variables are all higher than those when G∗ is 0.3.
Yet when G∗ is 0.4, the relation between the two curves change in that the dashed
one seems to bring more utility to the economy during the later part of the transition,
while with G∗ being less or equal to 0.3, the utility brought by the technology might
not be as much as the solid line.
Observation 3: When G∗ is low and a positive technology shock occurs, social
welfare in the economy with the zero capital-income tax rate may perform
better in the early part of the transition and worse in the later part of the
transition than that in the economy with the zero property tax rate. As G∗
increases, the situation becomes the opposite.
3. Impulse Response to a Positive Technology Shock with One Changing Tax Rate
Different from the second experiment, this experiment simulates the transition
caused by 1-percent technology shock when one tax rate, instead of G∗, is allowed
to change after the shock. As before, the tax rates in the original steady state are
optimal. Figures 18 and 19 show the result derived when G∗ is 0.01 and the property
tax rate is zero. The original optimal capital-income and labor-income tax rates are
-31.23 and 27.88 percent. The solid, dashed and dotted, and dotted curves in each
small figure are derived when the capital-income tax rate, labor-income tax rate, and
property tax rate is allowed to fluctuate, respectively. Except the top left figure, the
others in Figure 19 illustrate the transitions of capital-income, labor-income, and
property tax rate when one of them is allowed to move after the shock.
In Figure 18, at quarter 0, the exit threshold increases by 1.1 percent derived
with the changing capital-income tax rate and 1.12 percent derived with the changing
labor-income or property tax rate. The transitions of the tax rates in the next figure
72Figure 18. Impulse Response When εz = 0.01, G
∗ = 0.1 (τc—Solid, τw—Dashed & Dotted, τp—Dashed)
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Figure 18. continued
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Figure 19. Rest of the Impulse Response When εz = 0.01, G
∗ = 0.1 (τc—Solid, τw—Dashed & Dotted, τp—Dashed)
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show that all the three tax rates fall at quarter 0 because of the fixed G∗ and the
increase in employment. Remember in the second experiment, when the initial G∗ is
0.1 and the capital-income tax rate is zero, the exit threshold rises by 1.15 percent,
which is higher than 1.12 percent here. This is because in this experiment, a lower
property tax rate at quarter 0 raises the plant value so that the exit threshold is
slightly less than 1.15 percent. Also in the second experiment, when the initial G∗ is
0.1 and the property tax rate is zero, the exit threshold moves up by 1.095 percent,
which is lower than 1.1 percent here. The reason for the initial increase in the exit
threshold being a bit higher here is that a lower capital-income tax rate at quarter
0 encourages investment in new plants so that the exit threshold is slightly more
than 1.095 percent. After quarter 0, because G∗ is assumed to be fixed, and when
a positive technology shock happens, marginal plants exit the market, to collect
enough tax revenue to satisfy the fixed G∗ requires higher tax rate, which in turn
makes the exit threshold rises further more until quarter 4. The difference in the
deviations of the exit threshold derived with a different changing tax rate does not
make much difference in the exit and entry rates. When labor-income tax rate
fluctuate, the deviation of consumption falls below the other two curves, and the
employment responds more strongly as well. In Figure 19, a changing labor-income
tax rate brings more utility than a changing capital-income or property tax rate, and
the utility mainly comes from the increase in leisure when employment falls in the
first several quarters. Except the exit threshold, the deviations of various variables
derived when either capital-income or property tax rate fluctuates are almost the
same as those in Figure 13.
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4. Impulse Response to a Negative Government Expenditure Shock
In this experiment, we simulate the impulse responses caused by 1 percent sud-
den decrease in G∗ at quarter 0 when tax rates, (τc, τw) or (τp, τw), fluctuate after the
shock. A relation between the two tax rates must be built in order to derive their
transitions, and this relationship is assumed to connect two combinations of the two
rates that are each optimal for the old and new levels of government expenditure. To
simplify the calculation, this relation is assumed to be linear. Figures 20 and 21 show
the result derived when the original G∗ is 0.1 and 0.2, given the zero property tax
rate. The solid curve is derived with G∗ being 0.1, and the dotted curve is derived
with G∗ being 0.2. Figures 22 and 23 display the result derived when the original
G∗ is 0.1 and 0.2, given the zero capital-income tax rate.
In Figure 20, the top two figures are the transitional paths of capital-income
and labor-income tax rates. When G∗ falls by 1 percent at quarter 0, the fall in both
of the tax rates increases as G∗ becomes higher. When G∗ is 0.2, capital-income and
labor-income tax rates rise in the first 5 quarters, fall a bit at quarter 5, and stay
pretty constant afterwards. The exit threshold derived with a higher G∗ rises more
than that derived with a lower G∗ because of the larger fall in capital-income and
labor-income tax rates when G∗ is higher. At quarter 0, consumption rises by 0.04
percent when G∗ 0.1 and by 0.11 percent when G∗ is 0.2 and keeps rising afterwards.
Employment stays well above zero over the transition. When G∗ falls by 1 percent,
the economy with higher G∗ seems to be affected more. Both consumption and
employment derived with a higher G∗ are above those derived with a lower G∗. Also,
the decrease in G∗ seems to benefit the economy with a higher G∗ more than that
with a lower G∗.
77Figure 20. Impulse Response When G∗ Falls by 1 % and τp = 0
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Figure 20. continued
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Figure 21. Rest of the Impulse Response When G∗ Falls by 1 % and τp = 0
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In Figure 22, property and labor-income tax rates fall as G∗ decreases by 1
percent. Notice that the exit threshold moves downward over the transition because
of the fall in the property tax rate. Therefore, when G∗ is higher, the exit threshold
moves more downward, and the corresponding exit rate is also lower. Compared with
the economy with the zero property tax rate, the economy with the zero capital-
income tax rate has lower exit threshold over the transition, and except this, its
deviations of effective capital, consumption, employment, output, and investment are
all higher. However, because both consumption and employment rise, its deviation
of utility is almost the same as that derived with the zero property tax rate.
Observation 4: Consumption and employment are more stimulated by a negative
shock to government expenditure when the capital-income tax rate is zero.
Observation 5: The unexpected decrease of government expenditure brings more
utility to the economy with a higher G∗.
81Figure 22. Impulse Response When G∗ Falls by 1 % and τc = 0
82Figure 23. Rest of the Impulse Response When G∗ Falls by 1 % and τc = 0
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Figure 23. continued
84
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Based on a vintage-capital model with exit and entry of plants developed by
Campbell (1998), this paper enlarges the model by combining a government sector
into it and examines the effects of the three tax instruments, including capital-
income, labor-income, and property taxes, on the steady-state economy as well as
the transitional economy. In Chapter III, given various combinations of transformed
government expenditure and tax rates, a steady-state transformed economy where,
except idiosyncratic shocks, there is no other types of shocks at all, is solved. A
comparison is further made among different sets of optimal steady-state values, and
the conclusions are reached to provide some guides of optimal taxation for the gov-
ernment. They are summarized as follows:
In the case of zero property tax rate, when government expenditure is close
to zero, raising the capital-income subsidy may be beneficial to the economy. As a
matter of fact, the optimal capital-income tax rate may be negative, zero, or positive,
depending on the magnitude of government expenditure.
After a comparison between the optimal steady-state values derived with zero
property tax rate and those derived with zero capital-income tax rate, it is found
that to choose between taxing capital income or taxing property also depends on the
level of government expenditure.
When it is feasible for the government to tax on capital income, labor income,
and property, the optimal capital-income tax rate is always negative.
Following that, a dynamic system is built and solved in Chapter IV. Four
quantitative experiments are performed under different assumptions. The relevant
results are summarized as follows:
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Although subsidizing capital by taxing labor brings higher utility in the steady
state when the government expenditure is near zero, the fact that the loss of utility
caused by the change in the capital-income and labor-income tax rates over the
transition is too large makes this idea impractical.
In contrast to the similarity among the transitional paths of a variable derived
with different G∗ in the case of the zero property tax rate, the transition of a variable
derived with a higher G∗ in the case of the zero capital-income tax rate seems to re-
spond more than that derived with a lower G∗ when faced with a positive technology
shock.
When G∗ is low and a positive technology shock occurs, social welfare in the
economy with the zero capital-income tax rate may perform better in the early part
of the transition and worse in the later part of the transition than that in the economy
with the zero property tax rate. As G∗ increases, the situation becomes the opposite.
Consumption and employment are more stimulated by a negative shock to gov-
ernment expenditure when the capital-income tax rate is zero.
The unexpected decrease of government expenditure brings more utility to the
economy with a higher G∗.
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